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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TRUSTS-RULE AGAiNsT PERPETuITEr_-Cy Pius: DoMNANT

GEN-

EIAL TESTAMENTARY INTENT AS A PREREQUISITE TO APPLICATION-

In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970).
Testator provided that a trust "cease and determine upon the death
of my wife... or thirty years from the date of my death, whichever

shall last occur... ." After finding the provision violative of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the Supreme Court of Hawaii judicially adopted
the cy pres (equitable approximation) doctrine to uphold the trust by
shortening the period from 30 to 21 years. The court held specifically

that "any interest which would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
shall be reformed within the limits of that rule to approximate most
closely the intention of the creator of the interest." In re Estate of
Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970).
By judicially adopting cy pres in the perpetuities context, Hawaii
joins only two states: New Hampshire and Mississippi.1 While 14 other
states have legislatively reformed the Rule Against Perpetuities in
varying degrees,2 the majority of American jurisdictions still adhere to
the time-tested common law Rule.3
The New Hampshire courts have consistently adhered to the equitable approximation rule of Edgerly v. Barker since 1891;4 however, the
1. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321,
140 So. 2d 843 (1962). There is a possibility that Kansas, by virtue of In re Foster's
Estate, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962), could be included. A void devise was modified
in that case; however, there was no formal adoption of cy pres.
2. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text, infra.
3. The classic statement of the orthodox Rule Against Perpetuities is: "No interest
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, Tim RuLE AGAnMsT PEaPLMTIES § 201 (4th
ed. 1942).
While most of the American jurisdictions still submit to the unmitigated harshness
of the Rule as stated above, Great Britain has enacted a statute which provides that
where a gift violates the Rule Against Perpetuities by reason of an age contingency in
excess of twenty-one, the contingency may be reduced to twenty-one in order to save
the gift. Law of Property Act, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, C.2d, § 163, at 688 (1925). Several state
statutes in the U.S. have been modelled after the British Provision. See note 7, infra.
4. 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891). For a detailed discussion of the rule, see text
accompanying notes 15-25, infra.
See also Wentworth v. Wentworth, 77 N.H. 400, 92 A. 733 (1914); Gale v. Gale, 85
N.H. 358, 159 A. 122 (1932); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d
207 (;953).
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movement for perpetuities reform elsewhere in the United States has
only become viable within the last quarter-century." Strong advocacy
by legal scholars for implementation of reform measures has led to a
number of legislative formulas which mitigate the destructive effect
of the common law Rule.6 Some provide for reduction of age contingencies,7 which would be inadequate to empower courts to do what the
Chun court did-reduce a term of years. Others, adopting a "Waitand-See" approach, make the validity or invalidity of the interest
turn on actual, rather than possible, events.' Still others make broad
provision for effectuation of the creator's approximate intent. Combining the latter two formulae is the Vermont provision, part of which
is nearly verbatim the holding in Ckun:'0

5. See generally Leach, Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 VA~N. L. Rv. 1381
(1964).
The first legislative provision enacted to reform the common law Rule dates back
about two decades. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon 1950). Mississippi did
not decide Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 147 So. 2d 843 (1962), until less than a
decade ago.
6. Most notable is Professor Barton Leach, who, following the enactment of the
Pennsylvania provision, supra note 5, struck while the iron was hot and soon thereafter
authored Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAIv. L.
Rtv. 721 (1952). In a later article, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARv. L.
Rv. 973, 987-90 (1965), he recounts how, in turn, Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut
enacted modest perpetuities reform bills shortly after publication of the article. The cited
passages in the latter article also demonstrate the distinct probability that Professor
Leach penned the language used by the Hawaii court when he, with others, drafted the
Vermont provision cited in the text at note 10, infra.
The pressure for perpetuities reform has not slackened with the advent of cy pres
statutory provisions. See, e.g., Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity: PerpetuitiesReform
Without Waiting, 20 STAN. L. REV. 459 (1968).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (1958) ; ME. R v. STAT. ANN. it. 33, § 102 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 16, § 197A (Supp. 1961) (repealed 1970); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
184A, § 2 (1969) ; N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 9-1.2 (1967).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (1958); Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1963); M.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A (Supp. 1961)
(repealed 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 1 (1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2131.08 (Page 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon 1950); VT.
STAT. ANN. it. 27, § 501 (1967).
9. CAL. CIv. CODE 715.5 (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1957); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 381.216 (1963); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 442.555 (Supp. 1970); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2131.08 (Page 1968); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1291b (Supp. 1970); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 501 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.030 (1965).
The Washington provision reads as follows:
If, at the expiration of any period in which an instrument creating a trust or any
provision thereof is not to be rendered invalid by the rule against perpetuities, any
of the trust assets have not by the terms of the trust instrument become distributable
or vested, then such assets shall be then distributed as the superior court having
jurisdiction shall direct, giving effect to the general intent of the creator or the trust.
WASH. REv. CODE § 11.98.030 (1965). There appear to have been no appellate decisions
construing this provision as of April, 1971.
10. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967).
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Perpetuities
•* Any. interest in real or personal -property which would violate
the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits
of that rule,, to approximate most closely the intention of the
creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would
violate said rule and reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events.
The majority in Chun acknowledged that the case was the first in
Hawaii posing the question of whether a testamentary trust, clearly
violative of the Rule by virtue of an excessive term of years, was to
be judicially salvaged "in order to effectuate testator's intent.""' The
court affirmed that the common law Rule has continuing vitality and
is responsive to the practical needs of modern times, outlining three
broad policies of which the Rule is supportive: freeing wealth from
hampering restrictions; giving the ultimate recipient control within a
reasonable time; and letting the living control wealth. "Limiting an
invalid term of thirty years," the court said, "does no violence to any
,of the above policies or to the testator's general intent."12 Additionally,
the court noted that a decedent's general testamentary intent has been
judicially recognized in an analogous body of law applying the doctrine
of equitable approximation to a charitable trust which would otherwise
fail. 3
After pointing out that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a "peremptory command of law" the object of which is to defeat-rather than
effectuate-intention, two dissenting justices characterized the majority's simultaneous recital of the Rule's continuing validity and its
refusal to apply it in the face of a clear violation as "the height of
contradiction and illogic." They contended that "if no justification
exists in reason or on grounds of public policy for the continued en-

11. 469 P.2d at 186.
12. Id.
13. Id. The theory of cy pres in the charitable trusts. context may be expressed as
follows: Although the donor intended to apply the gift to a particular charitable purpose
designated by him, which subsequently became impossible, where it is shown that he had
a more general intention to devote the -property to charitable purposes, the court will
save the charitable trust by carrying out the more general purpose and approximating
his intent-for example, by applying the gift to a different institution than the one
designated by the donor. See, e.g., Town- of Brookline v. Barnes, 327 Mass. 201, 97
N.E.2d 651 (1951); In re Syracuse University, 3 N.Y.2d 665, 171 N.Y.S.2d 545, 148
N.E.2d 671 (1958); Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 476i 24 N.W.2d 893 (1946);
4 A. Sco=, T=s LAw ol TRusTs § 399 (2d ed. 1956).
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forcement of the Rule, then the court should, with directness, do away
with the Rule."' 4
There is room for argument that the Chun majority has done precisely that.
Illustration of this assertion entails a re-examination of Edgerly v.
Barker-the fountainhead of judicial cy pres-and its progeny. In
Edgerly, testator left the bulk of his estate to trustees, providing:
"[W] hen the youngest of said children [of testator's son] shall arrive
at the age of forty years, then all my estate shall be theirs ....2 5
Using a remoteness-of-vesting test, the court determined that the
interest would be void under the common law Rule." However, since it
appeared that testator's dominant intent was simply to make a giftnot to postpone vesting until the youngest reached the age of fortythe court, on that basis, applied cy pres and reduced the age contingency to twenty-one years, saying: 17
His intent that the grandchildren shall not have the remainder
till the youngest arrives at the age of 40 years is modified by his
intent that they shall have it, and that the will shall take effect as
far as possible. The 40 years are reduced to 21 by his general approximating purpose, which is a part of the will.
Edgerly, then, embodies a rather clear-cut statement that the general
intent to make a gift, bequest, or devise must, in fact, be dominant
before cy pres may properly be utilized to salvage the interest
created.' 8 Examination of later cases discloses that, in general, the New

14. 469 P.2d at 188.
15. 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900, 901 (1891).
16. The fact that a later child of the son might be born and might attain age 40 more
than 21 years after the death of all persons in being at testator's death would, under an
orthodox analysis, invalidate the whole gift. See generally Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638, 648-51 (1938).
17. 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900, 916 (1891).
18. See Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
MicH. L. Rav. 1, 21 (1963), where the author, after quoting from Edgerly, says:
The crux of the matter, then, is the presence of a dominant and general intention,
and the obvious inference of such an intention arising from the fact that a donor
chose to give property to certain people. This is the basis for any statutory direction to approximate such an intention as closely as possible, that is, that the
donor's paramount purpose is evident from the instrument.
In connection with Professor Browder's remarks concerning statutory directives, see
text at notes 32-36, infra.
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Hampshire, court has retained- and clarified this salient characteristic
of Edgerly.
The New Hampshire court, in the early decisions following Edgerly,
indicated that cy pres was not to be applied in mechanical fashion.
Where a bill in equity sought construction of a will conditioning defendant remainderman's interest on the failure of the trustees of a
charitable devise to perform their duties faithfully, Edgerly was cited
for the proposition that the remainderman's interest was void because
conditioned on an event which might never occur.19 The court did not
even discuss whether the remainderman's interest ought to be reformed so as to be conditioned on occurrence within the period of the
Rule. Similarly, where a conditional fee was to be established with a
remainder over to certain societies if the fee-holders failed to meet
express conditions, the New Hampshire court relied in part on Edgerly
for the proposition that the interest of the societies, limited on an
indefinite failure of issue, confficted with public policy and was void
for remoteness.20 Impliedly, then, the dominant-intent rationale of
Edgerly is preserved in these early results.
Later, the court explicitly affirmed the Edgerly case as being one
where "[the] limitations [were] slightly in excess of those permitted
by law, and it appeared that there was a primary intent that the devise
take effect, even though the precise limitation could not .. .. '21 The
view was reaffirmed in Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, where the
court said the rationale of Edgerly was that:2'
[W]herever possible, a will should be construed to carry out the
primary intent to accomplish a legal testamentary disposition even
though the will may have inadvertently exposed a secondary intent to accomplish the testamentary disposition in an ineffective
manner.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, likewise, interpreted the New
Hampshire rule in this way. In Hussey v. Sargent,2 3 a case involving
construction of the will of a New Hampshire domiciliary, the court
19. Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. LeFebre, 69 N.H. 238, 45 A. 1087 (1898).
20. Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414, 62 A. 647 (1905).
21. Gale v. Gale, 85 N.H. 358, 159 A. 122, 123 (1932).
22. 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207, 211 (1953).
23. 116 Ky.53, 75 S.NV. 211 (1903).
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was confronted with a provision for accumulation of specific portions
of income for the benefit of testator's children, to be paid to them when
testator's daughter reached the age of 35, or if she did not live that
long, at such date as she would have reached 35. The Kentucky court
applied the law of New Hampshire and found the Edgerly case controlling, saying:24

[T]he court sustained [the bequest in Edgerly] . . . upon the
theory that the controllingidea of the testator was that his grandchildren should have the remainder of his estate, and that the postponement of this devise until the youngest was 40 years old was
secondary and subordinate, and that the court would not permit
the plain intent of the testator that his grandchildren should have
the estate to be defeated by the provision ....
However, the consistency with which the Edgerly rule has been applied in New Hampshire was marred by a 1914 case, Wentworth v.
Wentworth.25 There testator disposed of certain "family pictures" in
his will as follows:26
to the eldest of my sons who may be living at the decease of my
wife and myself, to have and to hold the same in trust to preserve
and to be transferred at his death to my next oldest son then
alive, and so on in regular succession according to seniority,
through all my sons, and then to the oldest grandson then alive,
and at his death to the next oldest ...

and so on ...

forever.

The sister of a deceased older grandson, in possession of the pictures,
sought to defend an action in detinue by the next eldest grandson,
her cousin, on the basis that the interest created in him was void under
the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court, citing Edgerly, stated: 27
The bequest is . . . invalid at common law by reason of the rule
against perpetuities ....
[I] t is the practice to carry out, so far

as possible, the intention of the testator; and here, although a
will might be invalid in its entirety under the rule .

24.
25.
26.
27.
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Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
77 N.H. 400, 92 A. 733 (1914).
Id. at 734.
Id.

. . ,

the be-

Perpetuities
quests in it are -good for the lives in being-at the testator's death
and 21 years and a fraction thereafter.
Plaintiff grandson was born during testator's life; therefore his interest
was validated.
Apparently the testator in Wentworth was given the benefit of cy
pres-"an essential element of equity jurisdiction" 2 -- when .his primary intent was not to make a simple gift to the natural objects of his
bounty, but to tie up property for an unreasonable length of time by
imposing a perpetual trust on persons unborn and unknown to himthe very evil sought to be avoided by imposition of the common law
Rule. In view of the consistency with which the New Hampshire court
has elsewhere expressed the requirement of a dominant general testamentary intent, Wentworth can only be regarded as aberrational.
But the result in Wentworth serves to accentuate the potentially
major problem with the present Hawaii decision. Chun, by contrast
with Edgerly, defines no clear-cut criterion, such as dominant intent,
which must be satisfied before cy pres will be applied to save the bequest. To be sure, there is discussion of "general intent" and "general
testamentary intent" in the opinion, but it is not explicit on this point
and, indeed, the point is contradicted by a flat reading of the holding
that "any interest which would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities"
shall be reformed so as to come within its limits2 9 Chun, then, could
be read to allow partial validity to be given to a scheme of devise
running contrary to the Rule and the policy underlying it-where the
dominant intent of the creator of the interest is not to make a simple
gift, but to control property far into the future. If such schemes are to
be given partial validity on a wholesale basis, as the specific holding
suggests, then what obtains is anew rule of property-rather than an
equitable rule of construction-one which effectively supersedes the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities. 0 Any such ultimate result,

28.
of cy
29.
30.

Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843, 855 (1962). The characterization
pres as an equitable rule of construction is examined in note 36, infra.
469 P.2d at 187 (emphasis added).
Expanding the specific language of Chun, a more forceful expression of this rule

of property might read:
Every interest in real or personal property will be modified, if necessary, so as

to vest within 21 years of some life in being at its creation, approximating, as nearly
as is possible, the intent of its creator.
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however, would clearly contradict the majority's assertion that the
orthodox common law Rule has continuing vitality in Hawaii.31
In jurisdictions where legislative cy pres provisions, using language
similar to that in Chun, appear to be broad directives to effectuate
approximate intent, the courts may be confronted with the same problem, since, in all these jurisdictions except Idaho, the orthodox common law Rule Against Perpetuities is in effect as well. " Case law applying these statutes is virtually non-existent,"a but one is still inclined
to think that a dominant-intent rationale should emerge.: To give

31. See text accompanying notes 11-13, supra.
32. Some qualification of the textual assertion is in order. Several states have clearly
indicated that the cy pres provisions are properly equitable rules of construction.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.5 (Supp. 1970), for example, allows reformation "to the extent
that it can be reformed or construed within [the Rule Against Perpetuities (Cal. Civ.
Code § 715.2] to give effect to the general intent of the creator of the interest whenever
the general intent can be ascertained."
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 442.555 (Supp. 1970) provides that whenever "reformation would
more closely approximate the primary purpose or scheme" a petition for reformation
may be filed to reform the instrument to the extent necessary to bring it within the Rule.
WASH. REv. CODE § 11.98.030 (1965), set out at note 9, supra., would allow the court
to avoid the problem as well.
TEXAS REV. Crv. STAT. art. 1291b, § 1 (Supp. 1970) contains the provision that "any
interest . . . shall be reformed," but section 2 makes it clear that the courts are granted
"the power to reform or construe . . . in accordance with the doctrine of cy pres."
Thus Texas, too, clearly has a rule of construction.
Idaho's perpetuities statute may be the strangest of all. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1957)
reads:
The absolute power of alienation of real property can not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance
of the lives of the persons in being at the creation of the limitation or condition,
and 25 years thereafter; there shall be no rule against perpetuities applicable to real
or personal property, nor any rule prohibiting the placing of restraints on the
alienation of personal property; no trust heretofore or hereafter created, either
testamentary or inter vivos, shall be declared void, but shall be so construed as to
eliminate parts violating the above provisions, and in such a way that the testators
or trustors wishes are carried out to the greatest extent permitted by this act; that
there shall be no presumption that a person is capable of having children at any stage
of adult life.
The Vermont, Ohio and Kentucky statutes cited in note 9, supra., however, contain
substantially the same language as that used by the court in Chun ("any interest . . .
shall be reformed") (emphasis added). It is mainly those jurisdictions which are referred to in the textual assertion.
For further discussion of why these provisions should be characterized as rules of
construction, see notes 34-36, infra.
33. In fact, from among the statutory provisions discussed in note 33, supra., there
appears to have been but a single case. In re McNeill's Estate, 230 Cal. App. 2d 449, 41
Cal. Rptr. 139 (1964), refers in passing to the California cy pres provision, § 715.5, as
evidencing legislative intent to construe the Rule Again Perpetuities (§ 715.2) liberally.
The court did so and construed one testator's devise as presently vested with beneficial
enjoyment delayed.
34. In addition to the reasons set forth in the text, it is worth noting here the possible significance of the use of the word "reformed" (". . . shall be reformed so as to
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partial effect where the dominant intent of the donor is to create an
interest which would exceed the limits of the Rule could lead to an
anomolous practice of giving effect to "approximations" of intent without regard to the equities of the situation. Furthermore, the net result
of such an approach would be to invariably favor the legislative cy
pres provisions over the common law Rule-thereby superseding express legislative intent, in some cases, that the Rule Against Perpetuities be in effect in the particular jurisdiction.5 The cy pres
provisions, then, ought to be characterized as equitable rules of construction.3 6
The Chun result is probably correct. Testator's dominant intent to
make a general testamentary gift is evident0 7 Yet, the Hawaii court
is open to criticism. The element of confusion introduced by discussing testamentary intent only generally, while stating the holding so
broadly, leaves Hawaii perpetuities law on shaky footing; if, as seems
likely, the court has not evolved a new rule of property superseding
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, then it may later have to

.... ") rather than, for example, "amended" or "modified" in these statutes. Though
by itself inconclusive, the word ordinarily connotes an equitable remedy. See BLAcx's
LAW DicroNARrY 1446 (4th ed. 1951).
See also Professor Browder's statement of the basis of these statutory provisions at
note 18, supra.
35. In California, Kentucky and Ohio the orthodox rule is codified. In Texas, there
is a constitutional prohibition against perpetuities. In Missouri, Washington and Vermont
the rule is not codified.
36. That such a characterization is proper is shown in the language of the court in
Carter v. Berry:
Cy pres in the United States is a doctrine of approximation, is applicable to devises
and is an essential element of equity jurisdiction. It is a simple rule of judicial
construction, designed to aid the court to ascertain and carry out, as nearly as may
be, the intention of the donor.
243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d. 843, 852 (1062). Likewise, the court in Chun adverts to the
equitable nature of the doctrine, calling it "equitable approximation" throughout the
opinion. See, e.g., 469 P.2d at 184.
Since Carter was decided, there have been no appellate decisions in which it played
a significant part. It has been cited in general support---giving effect to intent in willson a few occasions. Due to this lack of development, Carter is not as valuable as
Edgerly in gauging the impact of Chun. This note presupposes that the Hawaii court
would look to the New Hampshire development in deciding cases following Chun.
37. Chun Quan Yee Hop died leaving 16 children. On termination he wished 4 of the
trust corpus to go to the then-survivors among his four sons, and any lawful issue of a
deceased son, and other /4 to go to the then-survivors among his twelve daughters, and
lawful issue of any deceased daughter.
From this, the court may well have thought the primary general testamentary intent
so readily evident that it did not require explidt reaffirmation. Indeed, in 84 HAnv. L.
Ray. 738, 740 (1971) the note writer read Chun as being a case where the primary
general intent requirement was not diminished at all.
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clarify the basis for its holding. It is the opinion of the writer that the
Hawaii court, when the occasion arises, should explicitly adopt the
"dominant intent" rationale of Edgerly, thus effectuating the apparent
desire of the present majority to retain the common law Rule, subject
to application of cy pres where proper."
38.
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See text following note 11, supra.

